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The Four Stoic Personae
PHILLIP H. DE LACY
In the first book of Cicero's De officiis is a formulation of Stoic ethical
doctrine that has not received the attention it deserves. Cicero differen-
tiates four considerations that must be kept in mind when we ask, quid
decent. These four considerations he calls personae. Two pertain to our
nature, one to our circumstances, one to our choices. The two natural
personae are (a) the nature we share with all human beings, and (b) our
individual natures. The persona arising from circumstances is imposed on
us by chance and time, and that which pertains to our choices results
from our judgment of the kind of life we wish to live {De off. i.107-117).
This schematic formulation of four personae corresponding to four deter-
minants of ethical choices is, so far as I know, unparalleled in ancient
philosophical writings, although partial parallels may of course be found.
It raises some difficult questions. One set of questions pertains to the use
of the term persona and its Greek counterpart, Trpoaionov, in ethical contexts.
Another has to do with the doctrine's pedigree. Presumably Cicero found
it, or something like it, in the treatise of the Stoic Panaetius flepi tov
KaOrjKovTos, on which De officiis I and II were based (see De off. iii.y, and
Ad Att. xvi.i 1.4). Can we safely assume that it is authentically Panaetian,
and if so, is it also consistent with the teachings of the early Stoa, or is it
a Panaetian aberration ? And finally, how does the doctrine reflect Stoic
thought, as contrasted with the treatment of the determinants of ethical
choices by other ancient philosophers, notably Plato and Aristotle? This
paper will offer tentative answers to these questions.
I
Perhaps the most interesting feature of the term persona—prosopon in
ethical contexts is the way in which it combines a specification ofindividual
differences with a suggestion of detachment. An actor playing a role re-
mains distinct from the role he plays ; the prosopon is as external to him as
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the mask he wears when he plays it. Similarly, the ancient rhetorical prac-
tice of TTpoaojTTOTToua demanded of the orator an ability to speak in ways
appropriate to a variety of different characters. ^ In a more generalized
context, therefore, persona-prosopon may refer to an outward show as dis-
tinct from inner reality, or to a temporary or transitory course of action,
something put on or put off, as distinct from a persistent identity. This
detachment is reflected also in the evaluation of an actor's competence. He
may give an excellent performance of a worthless character (cf. Plutarch,
Lysander, ch. 23 [446 D]), and he laughs or weeps not according to his own
inclination but as the play requires (Plut. Demosthenes, ch. 22 [856 A]). Thus
the externality of the role permits a distinction between the part assigned,
which is not our doing, and our responsibility to play the part well.
But the term prosopon came also to be used in a contrasting way, to
indicate what is peculiar to the individual. The poet who composes a
drama may be viewed as portraying the words and actions of certain
kinds of persons, and the connection that he makes between character
and action is immediate and necessary. Agamemnon as a prosopon has an
identity to which his acts conform. It is not possible for Agamemnon to
behave like Thersites, or Thersites like Agamemnon. In this context
prosopon refers precisely to the distinctive features that identify the indi-
vidual and separate him off from other individuals. Far from being ex-
ternal, it is what makes him what he is.
Both of these uses of prosopon were exploited by the philosophers.
Plutarch offers many examples in addition to those already cited. He
uses the phrase -qdrj kuI TTpooojna with reference to moral character, whether
on the stage {De aud. poet. 28 EF) or off it [De invidia et odio 537 F). He
even speaks {Quaest. conviv. vii.8.i, 711 C) of the ethos of^ the prosopon, thus
suggesting that a prosopon carries an ethos with it. Yet elsewhere Plutarch
says that it is shameful for the aging statesman to exchange his political
prosopon for some other (An seni respublica gerenda sit, 785 C), and he de-
scribes the powerless Arrhidaeus as having only the name and prosopon
of king {An seni 791 E) . Thus in some passages prosopon is closely bound
up with character, but in others it is separable, either as a role that is
put on and off,2 or an appearance that misrepresents the reality.
3
1 See for example Qjuintilian, Inst. oral, iii.8.49; vi. 1.25-27; xi. 1.39-42.
2 Cf. also Antony 29 (928 F-929 A) . Antony was a tragic actor to the Romans, a comic
actor to the Egyptians. The rhetoricians also speak of putting a persona on or off; see for
example Cicero, De off. iii.43 and Quint. Inst. oral, iii.8.50.
3 Cf also Lucretius iii.58, -where persona is a mask that conceals the truth; and Cicero,
Tiisc. disp. V.73, where it is said of Epicurus that tantum modo induit personam philo-
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These examples, a few out of many,'* approximate at least two of the
four Ciceronian personae: the second, which ties our persona to our indi-
vidual nature, and the fourth, which makes out persona a matter of volun-
tary choice. Cicero's third persona, the role assigned to us by chance or
time, would include Arrhidaeus' kingship, since in Plutarch's view he was
king by chance, not from virtue (cf De Alexandri Magnifortuna aut virtute,
337 DE). A more explicit parallel, however, to Cicero's third persona is
found in the Cynic tradition. Teles (third century B.C.), in his work On
Self-sufficiency, gives Bion as his authority for the statement that tvxt], like
a poetess, assigns at one time the prosopon of -rrpioToXoyos, at another of
SeuTcpoAdyos, at one time the prosopon of king, at another of wanderer
{aXrjT-qs:) \ and Teles remarks that just as the good actor must play well
whatever role the poet gives him, so the good man must play whatever
role fortune has given him.^ Even earlier Demades, the sharp-tongued
Athenian orator, is reported to have said to Philip of Macedon (fr. 48
De Falco^ = Diodorus Siculus xvi.87) : /SaaiAeu, ttj? tvxt]? aoi TT^piOiiar^s
TTpoacoTTOv 'Ayafiefj-vovos, avrog ovk ala^vvr^ TTpdrTcov epya Qepalrov; "O King,
when fortune has clothed you in the role of Agamemnon, aren't you
ashamed to perform the acts of Thersites ?"
It is only the first of Cicero's four personae, then, for which a parallel
seems to be lacking; and indeed it is a surprising usage. All the other
personae are to some extent individuating, whereas the first is common to
all human beings. The stage analogy breaks down, unless the aim is to
difTerentiate the role of a human being from that of a lower animal or a
god. This may in fact be Cicero's intention, since the passage in which
he introduces the first persona {De off. i.107) follows closely on a discussion
of the difference between men and animals (i.105). Cicero's extended
use of the term is therefore not altogether unreasonable. <5
sophi et sibi hoc nomen inscripsit. The actor's mask provides an appropriate metaphor
for both the putting on and ofT of roles, and the concealment of one's true self
'^ The examples taken from Quintilian and Plutarch are of course post-Ciceronian and
could not have provided models for Panaetius. But they are convenient illustrations of
the ways in which prosopon can be used. For further material on Plutarch's use of dramatic
terms and concepts see E. O'Donnell, The Transferred Use of Theater Terms as a Feature
of Plutarch's Style. Dissertation, University of Pennsylvania, 1975.
5 Teletis Reliquiae'^, p. 3 Hense = Stobaeus, Vol. Ill, pp. 37-38 VVachsmuth-Hense.
Cf. also Teles, On Circumstances (p. 52 Hense = Stobaeus, Vol. V, p. 984 Wachsmuth-
Hense), where fortune is again compared to a dramatic poetess.
6 See also G. W. H. Lampe, A Patristic Greek Lexicon, s.v. Trpoaw-nov, X, D, p. 1 188, col. 2,
where one finds "le prosopon de la divinite et celui de I'humanite" in a citation from
Nestorius' Liber Heraclidis (Nau's French translation from Syriac).
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II
Historians of Stoicism generally accept the four Ciceronian personae as
authentic Panaetian doctrine. They tend to see in them a characteristi-
cally Panaetian concern with real people in real situations, rather than
with the idealized sage.'^ An exception is A. Schmekel, who regarded the
third and fourth personae as Cicero's own addition, on the grounds that
they do not combine with the first two to form a coherent scheme,
^
The well attested fragments of Panaetius are of no real help here, since
they contain no reference to any of the four personae. When one looks in
other ancient Stoic texts for a comparable analysis of the determinants
of moral conduct, most of the material comes from authors subsequent to
Cicero. A major source is Epictetus. In Diss, ii.io, Epictetus begins with
the exhortation, oKiifsai ris el "Examine who you are." The examination
that follows takes the form of a list of names, each contributing something
to the process of self-identification : you are a human being, a citizen of
the universe and a part of it, a son, a brother (ii.i 0.1-9). Epictetus then
shifts to a conditional form of expression : if you are a member of the
council of some city, if you are young, if you are old,^ if you are a father,
if you are a smith (ii. 10. 10-13). Each name of this kind, he says, when it
comes into consideration, always indicates the acts (epya) appropriate to
it (ii.io.ii).
Of two of the names on the list, son and brother, Epictetus uses the
phrase, tovto to irpooajTrov, thus hinting, but not actually saying, that the
other names also correspond to prosopa. The Stoic Hierocles (second cen-
tury A.D.) also uses the term prosopon with reference to the relation of
brother to brother, master to servant, parent to child. He says that each
member of such a pair will see more clearly how to behave toward the
other if he supposes himself to be the other—a supposition, he says,
especially easy for brothers, because they have from nature the same
prosopon. ^^
''Examples are M. Van Straaten, Panitius (Amsterdam, 1946), p. 266; M. Pohlenz,
Die Stoa, Vol. I (Gottingen, 1948), pp. 201-202; J. M. Rist, Stoic Philosophy (Cambridge
[England], 1969), pp. 186-188; F. H. Sandbach, The Stoics (London, 1975), pp. 125-127.
8 A. Schmekel, Die Philosophic der mittleren Stoa (Berlin, 1892), pp. 39-41.
' Cicero does not include age differences (young, old) in his account of the four
personae, but he mentions them soon thereafter {De off. i.122). P. Milton Valente, U£thique
stoicienne chez Cice'ron (Paris and Porto Alegre, 1956), p. 249, places them under the third
persona. Cicero himself, however, is not so specific; cf. i. 125: Ita fere officia reperientur
cum quaeretur quid deceat et quid aptum sit personis, temporibus, aetatibus.
10 Page 59 Von Arnim = Stobaeus, Vol. IV, pp. 660-661 Wachsmuth-Hense.
Hierocles also uses the term with reference to family relations on page 62 Von Arnim =
Stobaeus, Vol. IV, pp. 672-673 Wachsmuth-Hense.
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In Diss, i.2 Epictetus introduces quite a different />roj'o/»o«, which results
from one's TrapaoKevrj. In this discourse (i.2. 7) he lists two determinants of
what is reasonable (euAoyov) in any particular situation: one's prosopon,
and the value (a^i'a) one places on external things [to. €kt6s). Different
persons have different prosopa, the difference lying, apparently, in the
extent to which they have the strength to live the truly good Stoic life.
Not all horses are swift, and not all men can live the life of Socrates. Our
preparation (paraskeue) varies with our natural ability and our training.
Tt ovv; i7T€L8r] (xq)vijs elfii, dvoaTU) rrjs imfJieXcias tovtov eveKa; "What then?
Since I am without natural ability, shall I therefore stop taking care?"
No; I shall make the most of what I have (i.2. 34-37). Here the differen-
tiation of persons is in terms of their position on an ascending scale that
terminates in the sage. Those who differ from the sage are his inferiors.
This same relation of superior to inferior appears in the discourse on the
Cynic ideal (iii.22). The Cynic preserves to tov kuXov koI ayadov TrpoaiDirov
(iii.22.69). His way of life requires a special paraskeue which is beyond
the reach of most men (cf iii.22. 23, 107-109).
A. Bonhoffer, whose studies of Epictetus established that Epictetus'
affinities were with the early Stoa rather than the Stoa of Panaetius and
Posidonius, pointed out the differences between Epictetus' prosopa and
the personae of the De officiis and concluded, quite rightly, I think, that
Epictetus was not following Panaetius here. 11 Yet the possibility remains
that Epictetus and other late Stoics reflect a pre-Panaetian stage in the
development of the Stoic doctrine of prosopon, and that the Ciceronian
scheme is Panaetius' reaction to existing Stoic teaching. If we may believe
Seneca, there was already in the early Stoa a dispute about the use-
fulness of that part of philosophy quae dat propria cuique personae
praecepta nee in universum componit hominem; and Seneca gives as
examples the precepts telling the husband how to behave toward his wife,
the father how to raise his children, the master how to govern his
slaves [Epp. mar. 94.1). Seneca reports that the Stoic Ariston was opposed
to such detailed precepts, and that Cleanthes considered them weak if not
derived from fundamental philosophical doctrines {ibid. 94.2 and 4). The
opposition here described is one that could easily lead to the two kinds of
prosopa seen in Epictetus, on the one side the wise man, whose conduct
serves as a standard for all, and on the other an indefinitely long list of
names designating personal and family relations, age differences, trades
and professions, external circumstances, all of them calling for certain
specified kinds of conduct.
11 A. Bonhoffer, Die Ethik des Stoikers Epictet (Stuttgart, 1894), pp. iii-iv, lo-i i.
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If such a controversy did indeed exist in the early Stoa, then the
Ciceronian scheme represents an attempt to resolve it, not simply by
deriving the more detailed precepts from the more general principles,
but by analyzing the components common to all personae. At this level
of analysis Epictetus' prosopa do not fall into one or another of Cicero's
categories, but all have a part in all. The conduct of the smith, no less
than that of the sage, is determined by his being a man, having certain
natural abilities, acting under such-and-such circumstances, and aiming
at a certain way of life. The fourfold scheme thus provides a theoretical
basis for analyzing conduct at all levels, and to this extent it deemphasizes
the sage. And inasmuch as it recognizes the variables in human life, it
prepares the way for practical advice on how to deal with these variables.
In a way the third persona, that imposed by chance and time, is the
crucial one. As noted above (p. 165), a close parallel to this persona appears
in the Cynics Bion and Teles. Their position is very close to that of
Ariston; like them, Ariston compared the wise man to a good actor who,
whether he takes the role (prosopon) of Thersites or Agamemnon, plays
either one in the appropriate way. 12 One misses here a reference to
fortune as poetess. Yet fortune is important only as the source of the
circumstances under which we act and over which we have no control.
On Circumstances {Uepi TTepiardaeajv) was the title of one of the works in
which Teles called rvxr] a TroirJTpia (see note 5) . Ariston too attached great
importance to circumstances {rrepiaTaaeis) ; they have as much to do with
a wise man's choices as the word to be written has to do with a gram-
marian's choice of letters (Sextus Empiricus, Adv. math. xi.64-67 = SVF
I, frag. 361).
This concern with circumstances persisted in Stoicism. It is evident
in the importance attached to the timeliness [evKaipla) of right actions,
since circumstances change with time.i^ One of Posidonius' works included
a section -rrepl tov Kara -n^plaTaaiv kuOt^kovtos On Circumstantial Duty.^'* Still
later, Epictetus saw in circumstances the material (uAtj) for moral actions.
12 Diog. Laer. vii.i6o = SVF I, frag. 351. Thersites and Agamemnon were the examples
used by Demades. Bion and Teles had spoken more generically of king and wanderer,
famous and obscure, and the like. Thersites and Agamemnon reappear in Epictetus
{Diss, iii.22.28; iv.2.10), but Epictetus is interested in the qualitative differences in their
ways of life rather than the quality of the actor's performance.
13 Cf. De off. i.i 15: Regna, imperia, nobilitas, honores, divitiae, opes, eaque quae sunt
his contraria, in casu sita temporibus gubernantur. On evKcupia (Cicero's opportunitas)
see also SVF III, frag. 502 (p. 136.29), frag. 630 (p. 161.3); Cic. De fin. iii.45-46, 61;
Epict. Diss, ii.13.21 ; D. Tsekourakis, Studies in the Terminology of Early Stoic Ethics {Hermes
Einzelschriften, 32 [Wiesbaden, 1974]), pp. 56-57; J. M. Rist, Stoic Philosophy, p. 81.
14 Frag. 41a Edelstein-Kidd = Cicero, Ad Att. xvi.11.4.
Phillip H. De Lacy 169
They include the hardships sent by Zeus to test us and train our powers, is
That the source of these circumstances is Zeus rather than fortune is not
a crucial difference, since the terms fortune, providence, and fate all refer,
in the Stoic view, to the cosmic order established by divine reason, or
Zeus.
There is nothing in this Stoic background that identifies Panaetius as
the author of the Ciceronian fourfold scheme. The only reason for assign-
ing it to him remains Cicero's statement that he was following Panaetius
in De qfficiis I and II. But the alternatives are limited. Since the scheme
uses Stoic concepts to solve a Stoic problem, there is every reason to
believe that the author was a member of the school. To be sure, it is in
a sense Platonic; it establishes a finite plurality between the one (the
ideal represented by the sage) and the many (the endless diversity of
actual human lives). Cicero would have welcomed this aspect of the
theory and indeed might have let his Platonic sympathies influence his
presentation of it.^^ But Panaetius too was an admirer of Plato, and he
could have had the precepts of the Philebus in mind when he formulated
the fourfold scheme.
It is of course possible that Panaetius did not originate the scheme but
took it over from some earlier Stoic. It is simply the lack of evidence
that prevents us from pushing it back to an earlier period. There are
indeed two very tenuous bits of evidence, neither of them persuasive.
One is a list in Epictetus of five determinants of things that are done
:
Twv TTpaTTO[Ji€va)v TO, fM€v TTporjYovfievojs irpfXTTeTai, to. hk kutcc Treplaraaiv, to. Se
Kar' olKovofxiav, to. Se /cara avfx-rrepKpopav, to: Se /car' evaraaiv "Of things
that are done, some are done as primary ends, some in conformity with
circumstance, some with management of a household, some with sociabil-
ity, some with resistance." i' The first two items bear some resemblance
to the fourth and third personae, and it is conceivable that Epictetus was
following some early Stoic text. But the list as a whole is so unlike the
fourfold scheme that even if it is early it cannot be regarded as an antici-
pation of that scheme.
15 Diss, i.6.33—37; i.24. 1-2. The terms nepiaraais and uAij are closely joined in i. 6.34
and i.26.2.
16 On Cicero's references to this Platonic procedure see P. De Lacy, "Plato and the
Method of the Arts," The Classical Tradition: Literary and Historical Studies in Honor ofHarry
Caplan (Ithaca, 1966), pp. 129-130.
1^ Diss, iii.14.7. This sentence stands in isolation, without explanation or illustration.
The relation of -rrporiyovfievcos to Kara ireplaraoiv is clarified by Hierocles, On Marriage
(p. 52 Von Arnim = Stobaeus, Vol. IV, p. 502 Wachsmuth-Hense) : married life is
Trporjyovfjievos for the wise man, life without a wife is Kara ireplaraaiv. That is, some
ireptaTaais may prevent the attainment of the irporiyovfievov.
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The second bit of evidence is more perplexing. There is in the Magna
Moralia an account of actions that covers very nearly the same ground
as the four personae. In i.n and 14-15 (1187 b 4-30, 1188 a 38-b 24) the
author characterizes human beings as capable of generating actions and
identifies the apx'q of action as -npoaipeaig /cat ^ovXrjais koI to Kara Aoyov ttccv
"choice and wish and all that is in conformity with reason." Actions,
however, are subject to the limitations of one's nature (ch. 11) and of
force (/Sia, ch. 14) and necessity {dvdyKT), ch. 15). Force is an external
cause of action contrary to nature or to wish. Necessity also has to do
with externals; for example, a person who suffers a lesser harm in order
to escape a greater one is acting under the necessity imposed by things.
The obvious differences between this account and the four personae are
so great that a direct connection seems most unlikely. One of the obvious
differences is that in the Magna Moralia one's individual nature and the
external situation are regarded as restraints on one's choices and wishes,
whereas in the Ciceronian scheme they are co-determinants. It is just
possible that some Stoic found in this Peripatetic analysis a useful formu-
lation of the obstacles to be overcome by the wise man,!^ and that
Panaetius converted the obstacles into roles that demand from us appro-
priate action. Uncertainty about the date of the Magna Moralia makes the
whole question of its relation to Stoicism very uncertain indeed. It is
sometimes held that the Magna Moralia postdates the founding of the
Stoic school and reflects Stoic influence. 1^ This may well be so; but to
postulate an otherwise unknown Stoic source for the chapters cited above
would surely be to multiply entities beyond necessity.
Ill
The purpose of the doctrine of four personae was to provide a formula
for discovering for any given person in any given situation the appro-
priate act, quid deceat. The four considerations that determine the
correctness of the action are thought of as imposing on the agent four
different roles which he must bring into harmony in order to make the
right choice. This pluralization of roles would seem to destroy the individ-
uality of the moral agent ; he is not one person but four, playing four roles
18 As already noted, both the limitations of one's natural ability and the hazards of
fortune appear in Epictetus as obstacles to be overcome by the wise man. See above,
pp. 167 fF.
19 See for example A. A. Long, "Aristotle's Legacy to Stoic Ethics," Bulletin of the
Institute of Classical Studies of the University of London, 15 (1968), p. 83.
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that somehow result in a common act appropriate to them all. Where
is the unity of the moral agent to be found ?
The answer, I suggest, must be given in terms of basic Stoic doctrine.
The Stoics do not explain individualization in terms of some unique
essence or substance, but rather in terms of a unique set of relations. The
four personae express these relations so far as they pertain to moral action,
and collectively they identify the individual agent.
Here again Epictetus is helpful. He speaks of our axeaeis, our relations
to other persons and to the deity. Some of these axeaeis are natural, others
are acquired. Examples are pious, son, father, brother, citizen, husband,
wife, neighbor, companion, ruler, ruled. The good man is true to his
axdaeis, and his duties (KaO-qKovra) are measured {TTapafieTpeiTai,) by
them. The moral agent is thus characterized by his collection of re-
lations.20
The identity of the Stoic cosmic deity presents a similar unity in
plurality. He has many names, Zeus, Athena, Hera, Hephaestus, Poseidon,
Demeter, and the rest, corresponding to his many powers. 21 A unity
corresponding to the four personae, therefore, lies well within traditional
Stoic modes of thought, even if it was devised by Panaetius as a means of
promulgating his own version of Stoic ethics. 22
The distinctive features of the scheme, however, and specifically the
formulation in terms ofpersonae, remain Panaetius' own. What attraction
did this formulation have for him? One may conjecture that he viewed
it as a clarification, not an alteration, of Stoic teaching. For one thing,
it clearly broadens the base of human action to include more than one's
nature. This broadening may have been a reaction to Plato and Aristotle,
both of whom emphasize the relation of a person's ergon, his distinctive
activity, in the performance of which his virtue and happiness lie, to his
nature ; and they place the highest good in the performance of the ergon
that is most distinctively human.23
20 Relevant passages include Diss, ii.14.8; iii.2.4; iv.4.16; iv.8.20; iv.12.16; Ench. 30.
See P. De Lacy, "The Stoic Categories as Methodological Principles," TAPA 76 (1945),
pp. 257, 260.
21 Cf. Cleanthes, Hymn to ^eus, line i : noXvwvfie, and Diogenes of Babylon, frag. 33
{SVF III, p. 217) ; Cic. De not. deor. ii.71 ; Diog. Laer. vii.147 (= SVF II, frag. 1021, p.
305). See also A. J. Festugiere, La Revelation d'Hermis Trismegiste, Vol. II, Le Dieu Cosmique
(Paris, 1949), pp. 515-516.
22 For a concise statement of novel features in Panaetius' ethics see F. H. Sandbach,
The Stoics, pp. 126-127.
23 E.g. Plato, Rep. 1, 352 d-354 a; Aristotle, Eth. Nic. i.7 (1097 b 24-28, 1098 a 7-18).
For Plato see also the relation established between tpvois and ipyov or eiriTi^Sevfia in Rep.
V, 453 b-456 b.
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To the Stoics, apparently, such a scheme was too narrow. They accep-
ted the correlation of erga with natures, virtues, and arts.^-* But man's
highest activity, his exercise of reason, is no more attached to one virtuous
ergon than to another. Nor is the exercise of reason peculiarly human ; it
is also divine, and the gods, presumably, are better at it than we are. Our
highest good is therefore not tightly bound to our own natures.
Here the doctrine of four personae has two further attractions. First,
since our personae determine our ergon, the two personae that represent our
nature (individual and common) determine it only in part. The rest is
determined by the place assigned to us in the cosmic order and by our own
exercise of reason in making choices for ourselves. Second, the element of
detachment implicit in the notion of a role helps to remind us that we
are not discrete entities. We are parts of a far greater unity to which we
are related in a variety of ways, and moreover in ways that change with
time. To identify ourselves with any one of our roles, to the exclusion of
the others, would lead us into error.
Thus on this interpretation at least the doctrine of the four personae
is Panaetius' attempt to analyze and explain how the multiple relations
of the individual to the Stoic universe are to be taken into account in the
actions of everyday life.
University of Pennsylvania
24 See for example Diog. Laer. vii.ioo = SVF III, fr. 83, p. 20.26-27; Plut. De
Stoicorum repugn. 1038 F = SVF III, fr. 211, p. 50.33-34; Sextus Empiricus, Adv. math.
xi.20o = SVF III, fr. 516, p. 139. 10-12. There are also many references to erga in Epic-
tetus. He speaks for example of the erga of the different names we have {Diss, ii.10.2),
the erga of the artisans (ii.9.10), of the philosopher (i.20.7), of the soul (iv.ii.6); and he
ties the excellence of animals and men to their distinctive erga (iii. 14.13-14).
